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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS REGARDING COUNSELING FOR
EXPECTANT PARENTS OF A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY: DO
ACOG’S NEW PRACTICE GUIDELINES SIGNIFY THE ARRIVAL
OF A BRAVE NEW WORLD?

INTRODUCTION
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with
even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the
philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to
resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high value
1
which the law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence.

In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act2 (ADA),
inspiring the “genuine hope that people with disabilities could participate
equally and be welcomed in all aspects of American life.”3 Passage of the
ADA was brought about by significant contributions from the disabled
community.4 The ADA was particularly significant because “[d]emands for
true integration and acceptance replaced those for mere tolerance, and the goal
looked to be achievable.”5
To what degree has this integration and acceptance taken place? The tort
actions of wrongful birth and wrongful life indicate that there is much work
left to be done in the realm of promoting equality for, and eliminating
discrimination towards, persons with disabilities. Wrongful birth and wrongful
life suits are a “unique subset of medical malpractice claims arising from a
defendant’s negligent failure to inform potential parents of the risk that their
offspring may suffer from a congenital defect.”6 In both wrongful birth and
wrongful life tort actions, the parents bringing suit are necessarily required to
avow that they would have aborted their fetus had they known of their now-

1. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213 (2006)).
3. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141 (2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Darpana N. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L. REV. 641, 644 (2006).
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living7 child’s congenital condition.8 The actionable injury in parents’9
wrongful birth lawsuits is their lost choice of whether or not to carry their
unborn child to term, given their hypothetical knowledge that the child would
be impaired.10 The legal theory in a wrongful life suit, similar to that of a
wrongful birth suit, is that the child, often via his guardian, asserts that he
would not have been born but for the health care provider’s negligent failure to
inform his parents of his potential congenital condition.11 The “operable
injury” in a wrongful life tort action is the life of the child itself.12 Both
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits can hardly be reconciled with the goals
and promises of the ADA.13
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
recently issued a Practice Bulletin regarding guidelines (Practice Guidelines)
for screening for fetal chromosomal abnormalities such as Down syndrome.14
The essence of the Practice Guidelines is that women of all ages should now
be offered both first trimester aneuploidy screening and amniocentesis

7. It seems theoretically possible to sustain such a claim if the child has deceased. It is
necessary, however, for the child to have been born.
8. There is some confusion surrounding the distinction between “wrongful conception” and
“wrongful birth” claims. Some scholars define wrongful birth claims as only applicable to claims
that require parents to avow that they would have had an abortion had they known of their fetus’
congenital condition. See, e.g., Michelle McEntire, Comment, Compensating Post-Conception
Prenatal Medical Malpractice While Respecting Life: A Recommendation to North Carolina
Legislators, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 761, 764 (2007) (noting that the injury in a claim for wrongful
birth is the plaintiff-parents’ deprivation of “the right to choose whether to terminate the
pregnancy”). Others include in the larger category of wrongful birth the claims mentioned above,
but also claims against a geneticist who failed to advise parents of their risk of bearing a child
with a disability before conception. See, e.g., Sheth, supra note 6, at 645; Kathleen A. Mahoney,
Note, Malpractice Claims Resulting from Negligent Preconception Genetic Testing: Do These
Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Conception, and Does the Categorization
Even Matter?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 773, 775 (2006). For purposes of this Comment, the latter
claims are defined as “wrongful conception” claims and, thus, largely outside the scope of this
Comment. In this Comment, wrongful birth claims are defined much as they are by the Missouri
legislature: “No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages based on
the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted.” MO.
REV. STAT. § 188.130(b) (2000); see also Mahoney, supra (discussing Minnesota’s similar
statutory ban of wrongful birth claims).
9. A wrongful birth lawsuit may be brought by either or both parents. 23 CAUSES OF
ACTION SECOND § 4, at 55 (Dana Campbell & Clark Kimball eds., 2003).
10. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1103–04, 1115 (Md. 2002); see also Hensel, supra
note 3, at 142 (discussing the development of wrongful birth claims).
11. Kassama, 792 A.2d at 1115; see Hensel, supra note 3, at 143.
12. Hensel, supra note 3, at 143; see Kassama, 792 A.2d at 1116.
13. See e.g., Hensel, supra note 2, at 141 (noting that the “excitement and optimism” that
ensued the passage of the ADA “has since diminished).
14. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 77: Screening for Fetal Chromosomal Abnormalities, 109
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 217 (2007) [hereinafter ACOG 77].
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examinations.15 These Practice Guidelines form the basis for the clinical
recommendations given by obstetricians and gynecologists across the country.
The abortion rate for fetuses with Down syndrome, among women who have
chosen to have such testing, is estimated to be between eighty and ninety
percent.16 The increased number of fetal chromosomal abnormalities being
diagnosed due to the promulgation of these Practice Guidelines teamed with
the current abortion rate for fetuses with such a diagnosis inevitably results in a
drastically increased number of abortions of fetuses diagnosed with a
disability, and has led to an eight percent decrease in the Down syndrome
population in the last two decades.17 Increased testing and, more arguably,
increased termination of fetuses with congenital conditions, may be in part due
to increased liability—or perceived liability—resulting from the availability of
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.18
With an increased focus on identifying congenital conditions in the womb
and a staggering abortion rate of fetuses with such conditions, one would
expect that—at the very least—expectant parents would be getting the proper
information regarding the life aspirations and achievements of individuals with
disabilities. Unfortunately, all too often this is not the case.19 State and federal
legislators have responded to this “Brave New World” where fetuses are
aborted by parents who have not been given information and counseling that
may have been valuable in their difficult decision-making process. The
Missouri legislature recently passed Missouri House Bill 818, or Section
191.923 of the Missouri Code, mandating informed genetic counseling for
expectant parents of a child with a disability.20 In 2007, Senator Brownback
introduced legislation, co-sponsored by Senator Kennedy, called the Prenatally
and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, containing many of the
Congressman Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin
same recommendations.21

15. Id. at 219.
16. Nancy Cambria, Laws Mandate Data on Down, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 9,
2008, at A1.
17. Id.
18. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 142 & n.7; see also Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group
v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ga. 1990) (“[W]ith the continued advances in medical science
which are occurring daily, the problems presented by the concept of ‘wrongful birth’ actions can
only become increasingly more numerous and more complex.”); Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine
Causes More Lawsuits, and New Administrative Courts Will Not Solve the Problem, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 1068, 1070–71 (1992) (book review) (arguing that improvements in technology generally
increase negligent behavior).
19. See infra Part III.
20. H.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (codified at MO. REV. STAT.
§ 191.923 (Supp. 2008)).
21. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th Cong.
(2007) (as introduced in the Senate, July 18, 2007).
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introduced the companion version of the bill in the House of Representatives.22
Congress recently passed this federal legislation (the Prenatally and Postnatally
Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act) on September 25, 2008, by a voice
vote,23 and the bill was signed into law by President Bush on October 8,
2008.24
This author believes that legislation similar to Section 191.923 of the
Missouri Code and the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions
Awareness Act is necessary both to eliminate the legal threat of wrongful birth
and wrongful life actions and to facilitate adequate and accurate genetic
counseling for expectant parents of children with disabilities.
Although a woman’s right to procreative choice, including access to an
abortion in certain circumstances, as affirmed in Roe v. Wade25 and subsequent
decisions, is indelibly woven into the fabric of wrongful birth or wrongful life
claims,26 this Comment is not meant to be a wide-ranging indictment of
abortion.27 Nor is the Comment intended to focus solely on Down syndrome.
Down syndrome, also known as trisomy 21, is one of many genetic disorders
that can be diagnosed in utero but cannot be “cured” in any clinical sense.28
The specific mention of Down syndrome in the recent ACOG Practice
22. Prenatally Diagnosed Condition Awareness Act of 2007, H.R. 3112, 110th Cong. (2007)
(as introduced in House, July 19, 2007).
23. 154 CONG. REC. H9918–20 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008).
24. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374,
122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See Hummel v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341, 1346 (N.J. 1992). In fact, wrongful birth and
wrongful life claims were brought before Roe. See id. at 1343 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227
A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967)); see generally Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the
Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 191–96, 191 n.15 (1993)
(providing a history of pre-Roe wrongful life and wrongful birth claims). The number and
success of such claims, however, has drastically increased since Roe was decided. See generally
Belsky, supra, at 191 (supporting the argument that judicial decisions concerning wrongful life
and wrongful birth actions “have followed a clear course paralleling the progression of the
constitutional right to practice birth control and procure abortions”).
27. For a discussion of the moral and social implications of the legal right to abortion as
opposed to actions for wrongful birth and wrongful life, see for example, Hensel, supra note 3, at
171–81 (arguing that although “[a] woman’s right to reproductive freedom includes the right to
make unpopular choices regarding the future of her pregnancy,” selective termination and
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions have distinct moral and social implications); Adrienne
Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 315, 340 (2003); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM.
J.L. & MED. 439, 457–58 (2003) (suggesting that allowing parents the choice to terminate a
pregnancy if the fetus is found to have a congenital disability does not send the message to
“persons with those conditions or disabilities that their lives are not valued or that it would be
preferable that they had not been born,” as some scholars have argued).
28. Down syndrome, or trisomy 21, is a condition that occurs from three copies of the
twenty-first chromosome.
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Guidelines,29 its mention in Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code,30 and in
the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act,31 and the
staggering abortion rate for fetuses diagnosed with Down syndrome,32 place
certain emphasis on this condition and make it particularly ripe for discussion
in the arena of prenatal testing and disability rights.
Rather, this Comment seeks to honestly discuss the impact the tort actions
of wrongful birth and wrongful life—both premised as they are on the
assertion that a fetus would have been aborted had the parents known of the
fetus’ congenital condition—have on the disabled community and on society at
large. Scholars have predicted the onset of defensive medicine as a result of
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions.33 Arguably, ACOG’s recent Practice
Guidelines represent such defensive medicine, insofar as it militates towards a
standard of care without sufficient guarantees that expectant parents are
receiving adequate information and counseling. This Comment attempts to
explore the subsequent impact defensive medicine may have on informed
consent and proposes some legislative solutions to eliminate the threat of legal
action via wrongful birth and wrongful life actions and to further ensure
accurate, non-directive genetic counseling.
Part I of this Comment evaluates some of the historical models of
disability and their impacts on legal approaches to disability law. Part II
discusses the flaws in the tort actions of wrongful birth and wrongful life and
the equally flawed impact these actions have had on the current state of genetic
counseling for expectant parents of a child with a disability. Part III discusses
the new ACOG Practice Guidelines, the response of some disability groups to
these Practice Guidelines, and some expected ramifications of the Practice
Guidelines. Part IV will discuss several legislative solutions to the current
legal climate, including some frameworks for barring wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions as well as a discussion of both the recently passed
Missouri legislation and the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions
Awareness Act. Part V will propose a more informed decision-making process
for expectant parents of a child with a disability, one that is in accord with the
goals and promises of the ADA, and that guarantees that all expectant parents
of a child diagnosed with a disability have access to the necessary information
and non-directive counseling.
29. ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217.
30. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923 (Supp. 2008).
31. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374,
122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8).
32. Cambria, supra note 16.
33. See generally Sheth, supra note 6, at 665 (“[A]llowing tort claims like wrongful birth
and wrongful life may encourage physicians to practice defensive medicine . . . . For example, . . .
[ordering] all available diagnostic tests in an effort to avoid liability for potentially exorbitant
compensatory damages, regardless of the cost or need for the diagnostic test.”).
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I. HISTORICAL MODELS OF DISABILITY
The use of interdisciplinary materials to influence legal issues and
outcomes is one of the great triumphs of the past few decades of legal
history.34 One need only look to cases such as Brown v. Board of Education35
to affirm this statement. Only recently, however, have legal scholars begun to
incorporate such interdisciplinary materials into a discussion of disability
related discourse.36 Because disability legal theory is a relative latecomer to
embrace the value of such interdisciplinary discourse, a review of the historical
models of disability is useful to evaluate the development of disability law.
These models “provide the foundation for deconstructing the images and
conceptions of disability that motivate the case law on wrongful birth and
wrongful life.”37
The medical model of disability has dominated and continues to dominate
much of public thinking about impairment and disability.38 The essence of this
model is that disability is a trait that results from the internal functional
limitations of an individual.39 Because disability is viewed as mainly a
medical issue, “[p]hysicians serve as the gatekeepers of disability” and “[i]t is
an unstated assumption that the medical community can precisely identify
impairments and accurately assess functionality.”40 This model essentially
echoes the familiar phrase that “biology is destiny.”41 Importantly, “[s]ince
society did not cause the social disadvantages that flow naturally from biology,
it is under no obligation . . . to alleviate them . . . . [and] any remediation
society chooses to undertake falls under the heading of charitable intervention
rather than entitlement.”42
Not surprisingly, the medical model’s focus on disability as biology leads
to the conclusion that the solution to disability is similarly biological.43 Social
policy focuses on “eliminat[ing] as much disability as possible, by using
medical technology to cure existing disability or prevent future disability . . . ,

34. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 145.
35. 347 U.S. 483, 493, n.11 (1954) (relying, in part, on evidence from social science
research to conclude that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional).
36. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627
(1999).
37. Hensel, supra note 3, at 146.
38. Id.
39. Crossley, supra note 36, at 649.
40. Hensel, supra note 3, at 146.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 146–47.
43. Id. at 147.
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and . . . us[ing] rehabilitative techniques to help disabled individuals
approximate dominant physical standards as closely as possible.”44
Genetic counseling that fails in its stated goal of being non-directive thus
both reflects and reinforces the medical model of disability. Parents who are
not presented with “timely and informative counseling,” which includes
“current information about the conditions that were tested for, the accuracy of
such tests, and resources for obtaining support services for such conditions”45
are done a disservice at the hands of years of public thinking about disability
that fails to recognize that disability is more than simply a medical condition to
be either cured or prevented. Wrongful birth and wrongful life tort suits
“broadcast the medical model’s message of the biological inferiority and
‘otherness’ of impaired individuals. Disability is reinforced as an inherent
personal trait, and biology, once again, becomes destiny.”46
By contrast, the social model of disability contends that disability is, at
least in part, “a social construction shaped by environmental factors.”47 As
opposed to the medical model, which focuses on the inherent physical
limitations of individuals, the social model “asserts that ‘disability’ is not
caused by impairment but by the social barriers . . . that people with
impairments . . . come up against in every arena.”48 A classic example would
be an individual in a wheelchair who cannot enter a building constructed with
stairs. Such an individual is “disabled vis-à-vis the building not because of any
physiological limitation, but because of a design flaw that did not contemplate
the non-ambulatory.”49 The important consequence of such thinking is that

44. Crossley, supra note 36, at 652 (footnotes omitted); see Hensel supra note 3, at 147.
While it is certainly not the contention of this Comment that all medical professionals view
disability in this manner, there is support for the view that the medical profession approaches
disability, at least partially, in this manner. For example, Steven J. Ralston, Reflections from the
Trenches: One Doctor’s Encounter with Disability Rights Arguments, in PRENATAL TESTING
AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 334, 335 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000), observes:
I cannot comment on all doctors’ medical training because it varies from medical school
to medical school. In general, what I was taught in medical school and in my training is
that disability—no matter what its form—is a bad thing and to be avoided at all costs.
Lectures or seminars on Down syndrome or other genetic syndromes were geared toward
the description of the abnormalities and the efforts that can be made to prevent the
problem in the first place; that children with congenital diseases may find their lives to be
rich and valuable was hardly recognized, much less stressed.
45. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923.3 (Supp. 2008).
46. Hensel, supra note 3, at 175 (footnotes omitted).
47. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000).
48. C. Thomas, Disability: Getting It “Right,” J. MED. ETHICS, 15, 15 (2008); see also
Hensel, supra note 3, at 147–48 (discussing the social model of disability).
49. Hensel, supra note 3, at 148.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1294

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1287

“assumptions of the inability to participate become self-fulfilling
prophecies.”50
There are admittedly limitations to the social model of disability. It is true
that some individuals have severely limiting conditions that exist
independently of any social construction of disability. The social model,
though, “need not deny that some limitations flow directly from impairment in
order to argue that externally imposed disadvantages should [nonetheless] be
remedied.”51 Indeed, one need only look to a typical wrongful birth or
wrongful life suit to realize that powerful external social barriers remain to
prevent full acceptance of people with disabilities into society.
An important attribute of the social model of disability is that, not
surprisingly, the remedy is also social in nature.52 By contrast to the medical
model, public policy response to disability is not to “cure” the defects of the
individual, but to “understand the disablist social relationships and forces
(individual and collective) that work both to directly socially exclude and to
undermine psychoemotional well-being of adults and children with
impairments.”53
A more recent theory of disability, referred to as the civil rights or minority
group model of disability, views disability primarily as a function of social
relationships and discrimination rather than inherent functional limitations, and
uses this recognition as the foundation of a group identity for people with
disabilities.54 Because to view disability as “unique and personal . . . implies
that it is an essentially private problem to be resolved, conquered or overcome
by individual effort rather than by public policies or social services,” the
minority model eschews this line of thinking.55 By encouraging the view that
disability is a socially generated notion, “individual impairments take a back
seat to the universal experience of discrimination and stigmatization.”56
Because under this model “individuals with disabilities are encouraged to see
themselves as members of a discrete minority group,” this model “transforms
relatively powerless individuals into a unified political body insistent on the
‘eradication of exclusionary practices and structures as a matter of civil
rights.’”57

50. Scotch, supra note 47, at 215.
51. Crossley, supra note 36, at 658.
52. Thomas, supra note 48, at 15–16.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 101 (1994); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at
149 (discussing the minority group model of disability).
55. Hahn, supra note 54, at 105.
56. Hensel, supra note 3, at 149.
57. Id. (quoting Crossley, supra note 36, at 659).
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Many scholars have credited passage of the ADA, in part, to the political
awareness borne out of the minority model of disability.58 Scholars have
argued that “Congress adopted a civil-rights model for addressing disability
issues by using the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a foundation for drafting and
interpreting the ADA.”59 Wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits are
particularly unacceptable when viewed through the lens of the social or
minority model of disability. Similarly, when expectant parents are unduly
influenced to either undergo prenatal testing or terminate a pregnancy because
of a diagnosed disability, the goals of the social and minority models of
disability are directly undermined.
II. WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE SUITS
A.

The Origins and Expansion of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Suits

Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are a “unique subset of medical
malpractice claims arising from a defendant’s negligent failure to inform
potential parents of the risk that their offspring may suffer from a congenital
defect.”60
In Becker v. Schwartz, the plaintiff mother gave birth to a child with Down
syndrome.61 The mother “alleged that her physician neither advised her of the
increased risk of [bearing a child] with birth defects [for] women over thirtyfive years of age nor recommended that she have an amniocentesis.”62 The
actionable injury in the parents’ wrongful birth suit was thus their lost choice
of whether or not to carry the unborn child to term, given their hypothetical
knowledge that the child would be impaired.63 The parents also filed a
wrongful life action on behalf of their child.64 The operable injury in the
wrongful life tort action was the child’s life itself.65 The legal theory in the
wrongful life suit was that the child asserted he would not have been born but
for the doctor’s failure to recommend an amniocentesis or fully inform the
parents of their chances of bearing a child with a genetic condition.66 The

58. Id. at 150 & n.48.
59. Sheth, supra note 6, at 654.
60. Id. at 644.
61. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d, 807, 808 (N.Y. 1978). The court described Dolores
Becker as “a retarded and brain-damaged infant who suffers, and will continue to suffer for the
remainder of her life, from Down’s Syndrome, commonly known as mongolism.” Id.; see also
Hensel, supra note 2, at 156–58 (discussing Becker and other early wrongful birth and wrongful
life cases).
62. Hensel, supra note 3, at 156; see Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808–09.
63. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813.
64. Id. at 809.
65. Id. at 812.
66. Id.
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court took the approach that is currently endorsed by many jurisdictions: to
deny the wrongful life claim67 and allow the wrongful birth claim to go
forward.68
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are essentially an outgrowth of
“wrongful conception” or “wrongful pregnancy” claims.69 Such claims “were
[usually] brought by parents against either physicians who had performed
negligent sterilization procedures . . . or manufacturers who had developed
faulty contraceptive products.”70 In such a situation, “the defendants’
negligence resulted in the birth of a healthy child despite the parents’ clearly
expressed desire to avoid conception.”71 Tort actions of this type have been
widely accepted in most jurisdictions, in large part because they “are consistent
with traditional medical malpractice and product liability actions” insofar as
“the plaintiff can easily establish that, but for the physician’s negligence, the
child . . . would not have been conceived.”72
In such cases, courts have typically “awarded the plaintiff mothers their
medical expenses and emotional distress damages associated with pregnancy
and childbirth.”73 The majority of courts, however, “have rejected the
expansion of such damages to the costs of raising the unexpected child to
adulthood,” usually because to do so would require courts to “label[ ] the
child’s life, rather than the mother’s experience as a legally compensable
‘injury.’”74
Medical advances allowing for sophisticated prenatal diagnosis of certain
disabilities “coupled with the loosening of the fetters on abortions triggered in
1973 by Roe v. Wade,” have given rise to the tort actions of wrongful birth and
wrongful life.75 In wrongful birth suits, the essence of the claim is that the
parents “would have aborted their unborn child had the impairment been
properly diagnosed. The injury identified . . . is the parents’ lost choice over
whether or not to carry [the disabled] child to term.”76 Wrongful life suits are
67. Id.; see Hensel, supra note 3, at 161 n.118 (listing jurisdictions that have rejected
wrongful life claims).
68. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813; see Sheth, supra note 6 at 650 n.59 (listing jurisdictions that
have allowed wrongful birth claims).
69. Hensel, supra note 3, at 151.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Hensel, supra note 3, at 151; see, e.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169, 1171
(Ohio 2000) (noting that “[m]ost United States jurisdictions recognize this cause of action”).
73. Hensel, supra note 3, at 151.
74. Id. at 151 & n.53 (listing cases that have refused to label the child’s life as an “injury”
thus refusing to provide plaintiff-mothers damages for child-rearing expenses).
75. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115 (Md. 2002) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 160 (describing the development of wrongful birth and
wrongful life claims).
76. Hensel, supra note 3, at 142–43.
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necessarily connected to wrongful birth suits. Because these suits are initiated
in the child’s name, the context of the suit is changed, and different
implications are raised.77 In a typical medical negligence action, of course, the
disability caused by a physician is identified as the harm in the tort model.78 In
wrongful life suits, because the physician’s “alleged negligence did not
actually cause the child’s impairment, but instead enabled the child to come
into being, the operable injury is the child’s life itself, with non-existence
identified as the preferred alternative.”79
Only four jurisdictions currently allow wrongful life suits.80 Courts that
have rejected wrongful life suits have usually done so either by reasoning that
life with a disability is better than no life at all, therefore that life cannot
constitute an injury at law;81 by finding that damages are incalculable;82 or by
recognizing that public policy dictates rejection of the tort.83 By contrast,
twenty-three jurisdictions recognize wrongful birth claims84—claims that are
arguably equally as damaging to the disability rights movement.85 One
explanation for the divergent treatment of these torts is that “courts have found
it more palatable to identify lost parental choice as the injury than to answer
the metaphysical question of whether non-existence is ever preferable to life,
however burdened.”86
The distinction between wrongful birth and wrongful life actions on the
grounds that the injury identified in a wrongful birth action is simply lost
choice, though, is largely an example of how much of the debate surrounding
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions has become “camouflaged by the
rhetoric of reproductive choice.”87 Because wrongful birth torts are reserved
for the births of children bearing congenital conditions, any distinction

77. See id. at 144 (arguing that the issues raised by each claim are fundamentally the same).
78. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978).
79. Hensel, supra note 3, at 143 (emphasis added).
80. See id. at 162 n.122 (listing cases from California, New Jersey, and Washington that
have recognized wrongful life suits); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2005). But see Turpin
v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
81. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 161 n.119 (listing cases that have refused to find that being
born in and of itself is a “legally cognizable injury”).
82. See id. at 161 n.120 (listing cases where courts have concluded that damages are
incalculable).
83. See id. at 161 n.121 (listing cases that note policy reasons for rejecting wrongful life
claims).
84. See Sheth supra note 6, at 650 & n.59.
85. Hensel, supra note 3, at 145 (“Even though the courts have treated the two torts
differently, they are analytically similar and lead to equally problematic anti-therapeutic
consequences.”).
86. Id. at 143.
87. Sheth, supra note 6, at 660.
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between wrongful birth and wrongful life actions on the basis of lost choice is
disingenuous.88 As disability rights scholar Wendy Hensel has pointed out:
In [wrongful birth] cases, it is not lost choice in the abstract that is actionable,
but the lost opportunity to abort the impaired child or to prevent conception.
As in wrongful life cases, the embodiment of the mother’s injury is the child
with defects who exists in the wake of the physician’s negligence, but here this
message arises by implication rather than as a fundamental element of the
cause of action. It is precisely because of this subtlety, however, that wrongful
birth merits even more exacting scrutiny than wrongful life. The misleading
rhetoric of choice and opportunity has allowed the tort of wrongful birth to
garner widespread legal recognition, but has obscured its anti-therapeutic
89
consequences.

Given the wrongful birth and wrongful life actions’ unique focus on the child’s
congenital condition, is the standard tort model truly appropriate?
B.

The Wrongful Reasoning and Harmful Results of Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life Actions

While many scholars contend that wrongful birth and wrongful life suits fit
comfortably within traditional tort principles,90 there seem to be at least a few
significant distinctions between these suits and a traditional tort suit. “First,
wrongful birth and wrongful life [suits] broaden the traditional element of
proximate cause” almost beyond recognition.91 Both these actions are, of
course, premised on the condition that the parents would have chosen abortion
over birth of their child. The plaintiff parents in a wrongful birth or wrongful
life suit, though, simply cannot assert that the physician is the proximate cause
of the birth condition.92 The physician did not cause the child to have any
genetic impairment, nor could she have given the child a life free from the
congenital condition with which she was born.93
Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims also differ significantly “from
traditional negligence claims because they involve two specific and unique
comparisons.”94 Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims require (1) a
comparison between the value of a child with a disability and the value of a

88. See, e.g., 23 CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND, supra note 9, § 4, at 55 (“Wrongful birth
actions are brought by parents to recover for the birth of an unhealthy child. The parents’ right to
recover is based on the defendant’s negligent deprivation of the parents’ right not to conceive the
child or to prevent the child’s birth.” (emphasis added)).
89. Hensel, supra note 3, at 166–67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 143 n.14 (listing works by various scholars who suggest that wrongful life and
wrongful birth tort claims correspond with “traditional negligence principles”).
91. Sheth, supra note 6, at 646.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 647.
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child born free of diagnosable impairment, and (2) a comparison between the
value of a life with a disability and nonexistence itself.95
First, the claims require a comparison between the value of a child with a
disability and the value of a child born free of impairment. As Hensel has
noted:
The rationales courts use both to award and to deny recovery for “normal”
children stand in contrast to those articulated by jurisdictions recognizing
wrongful birth or wrongful life in the context of a child born with a genetic
defect. While courts give heavy emphasis to the inherent benefits of rearing a
96
child in the former, many courts ignore these benefits in the latter.

This is despite evidence that many families find life with a child with a
disability to be a positive experience.97
Second, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims also require a comparison
between the value of a life with a disability and nonexistence itself.98 In other
words, because there is nothing a health care provider could have done to give
the child a nondisabled life, “it appears inconsistent with basic tort principles
[of compensation] to view the injury for which defendants are legally
responsible solely by reference to plaintiff’s present condition without taking
into consideration the fact that if defendants had not been negligent she would
not have been born at all.”99
As one court put it:
The sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor in this suit in tort.
Eugenic considerations are not controlling. We are not talking here about the
breeding of prize cattle. It may have been easier for the mother and less
expensive for the father to have terminated the life of their child while he was
an embryo, but these alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness
100
of the single human life to support a remedy in tort.

Another court has noted, “[t]he necessary inquiry is objective, not subjective;
the court cannot avoid assessing the ‘worth’ of the child’s life.”101

95. Id.
96. Hensel, supra note 3, at 154.
97. See e.g., Brian Skotko, Mothers of Children With Down Syndrome Reflect on Their
Postnatal Support, 115 PEDIATRICS 64, 73 (2005); Patricia Bauer, Stand Tall, DOWN SYNDROME
NEWS, Sunday, Aug. 5, 2007, at 68.
98. Sheth, supra note 6, at 647.
99. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982).
100. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967), overruled in part by Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979) (noting that unlike Gleitman, the court will recognize and allow
compensation for mental and emotional distress in wrongful birth cases); see also Sheth, supra
note 6, at 648–49 (discussing Gleitman).
101. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 174–75 & n.183 (quoting Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353
(1986)).
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By devaluing the life of a child with a disability as compared to the life of
a child without that particular disability, and by reducing the value of a child
with a disability to below existence itself, wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims significantly “discount, or even nullify, the value of life with a
disability.”102 The tragedy of such reasoning is that it comes at a time when
people with disabilities are enjoying significantly improved lives.103
The logic and process of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims has a
severely negatively impact on the children involved in these suits. Courts have
sometimes overlooked this truism by accepting the logic that reimbursing
parents for the medical and educational expenses they may incur in raising a
child with a disability is a positive and appropriate response to the birth of a
child with a disability.104 In essence, courts have “fail[ed] to see how the
parents’ recovery of extraordinary medical and educational expenses, so as to
minimize the detrimental effect of the child’s impairment, is outweighed by
any speculation about stigma that he might suffer.”105 Far from being
speculative, though, the societal stigma reinforced by the testimony and
reflected by the suit itself is the very real result of his or her parents’ testimony
in open court that they would have aborted the child had they known of his or
her congenital condition. This testimony is necessary to establish the causation
required by the tort model—some “parents have even sought to introduce their
children as [demonstrative] exhibits in litigation.”106
It is not difficult to see that “[s]uch testimony is emotionally crippling not
only to the child suffering from physical or mental infirmities, but also to the
larger disability community that seeks equality of opportunity and full
participation, both of which are goals supported by the ADA.”107 As opposed
to “outweighing” any perceived damage to the child with a disability, awarding
damages to an individual plaintiff is itself debilitating to the disability rights
movement. This is because along with the delivery of damages to an
individual litigant comes the demoralizing message that an individual with a
disability is inherently deficient—so deficient, in fact, that his or her life may
constitute an injury at law.108 Simply put, the obvious implication of wrongful

102. Sheth, supra note 6, at 648 (citing Phillips v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 537, 543
(D.S.C. 1980); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12–13 (N.J. 1979)).
103. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 97.
104. See Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (finding that
plaintiffs were entitled to prove and recover medical and educational expenses in a wrongful birth
action).
105. Id. at 1207.
106. Hensel, supra note 3, at 172 & n.174; see also Thornhill v. Midwest Physician Ctr., 787
N.E.2d 247, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that it was within the circuit court’s discretion to bar
plaintiff-parent from using her child as a “demonstrative exhibit” in litigation).
107. Sheth, supra note 6, at 660.
108. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 143–54, 151.
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birth and wrongful life suits is that this child should not be alive. As Hensel
has noted, “any benefits that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions secure
for the individual plaintiff come at a cost of demeaning and demoralizing antitherapeutic messages delivered to the community of people with disabilities
and to greater society.”109
C. The Perceived Benefits Do Not Outweigh the Harms
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits are often justified on two main
grounds: “(1) they establish a means to deter negligent conduct by health care
providers” and thereby preserve parental autonomy; and “(2) they compensate
parents and children for injuries or losses sustained as a result of this negligent
conduct.”110
There are, however, many strong arguments against the use of wrongful
birth and wrongful life suits as means to deter negligence among health care
providers. For starters, Darpana Sheth has argued that “allowing tort claims
like wrongful birth and wrongful life may encourage physicians to practice
defensive medicine, which could lead to increases in the cost of healthcare.”111
An example of defensive medicine would be to order “all available diagnostic
tests in an effort to avoid liability for potentially exorbitant compensatory
damages, regardless of the cost or need for the diagnostic test.”112 ACOG’s
most recent Practice Guidelines offering “practical recommendations for
implementing Down syndrome screening in practice,”113 arguably, represent
such defensive medicine and are discussed below in Part III.
Moreover, the health care provider’s duty of care—her duty to provide
expectant mothers with accurate information so they can decide whether or not
to continue a pregnancy—is undermined where testing itself becomes a duty
on the part of expectant mothers, and the existence of these causes of action
creates incentives, pressuring women to terminate pregnancies.
The
unintended consequence of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits is often that
health care providers may, in their fear of litigation, overstate the effects of
certain disabilities and thus not provide the “informed consent” each woman is
guaranteed.114 Courts have openly expressed concern “that physicians,
uncertain of the distress parents might feel about bearing a child with genetic
abnormalities, would resort to recommending abortion, fearing a wrongful

109. Id. at 164.
110. Sheth, supra note 6, at 664; see also Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1114 (Md.
2002); Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 811 (N.J. 1999).
111. Sheth, supra note 6, at 665.
112. Id.
113. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217.
114. See Stephanie S. Gold, An Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1005, 1039 (1996); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 168–71.
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birth lawsuit.”115 One need not look far for examples of such situations. A set
of parents, thinking their child had one disability, exercised their right for a
selective abortion, only to discover their child had a completely different
disability.116 Another set of parents received a telephone call informing them
that their child had a genetic impairment; in the same phone call, they were
reassured that the doctor had already scheduled the abortion for the next day.117
“Under such circumstances, what exactly is the meaning of informed
consent?”118 Some have argued that selective abortions in the atmosphere
under which information is currently presented to women offer less of a
choice, and more of a mandate:
The new technology of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion offers new
choices, but it also creates new structures and new limitations on choice.
Because of the society in which we live, the choices are inevitably couched in
terms of production and commodification, and thus do not move us to see new
119
levels of genuine choice.

Defensive medicine, insofar as it may place excessive pressure on a woman to
have an abortion, frustrates rather than enhances a woman’s right to informed
procreative choice.
Adrienne Asch, a disability rights scholar and staunch pro-choice advocate,
has noted, as defensive medicine becomes the standard, disability rights
advocates’ fears will be realized that “it will be very difficult for most families
to consider bringing children with diagnosable disabilities into the world if
they know that the society believes that their births should have been
prevented.”120 Parental autonomy demands that “at least the decisions [to have
eugenic abortions] will be those of the people ultimately raising children, and
not society, in the form of its insurance carriers and clinicians as
gatekeepers.”121 Social pressure, like defensive medicine, drains parental
autonomy. The argument that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
actually promote parental autonomy is thus inaccurate and misleading.
It is worth noting as well, that the low correlation between the incidence of
medical negligence and associated lawsuits indicates that there is little
evidence to show that malpractice suits actually target and reduce medical
negligence.122 Because relatively few patients injured by medical malpractice
115. McEntire, supra note 8, at 778 (citing Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C.
1985)).
116. RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS 130 (1999).
117. KIM KLUGER-BELL, UNSPEAKABLE LOSSES 86 (1998).
118. RAPP, supra note 116, at 130.
119. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY 14 (1986).
120. Asch, supra note 27, at 340.
121. Id. at 339.
122. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002).
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ever actually sue, and because “many malpractice lawsuits are brought and
won by patients even though expert reviewers can identify no evidence of
negligent care,” there is little evidence that such suits provide any real
deterrence to future acts of negligence.123 The particularly low correlation
between the incidence of children born with a congenital condition and the
incidence of wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits seems to further weaken
the argument that these suits truly serve any deterrent purpose.124
Furthermore, if medical negligence is really the issue addressed by
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, there are other mechanisms that have
been proven more effective. Mandatory specialized training in the field of
genetic testing for obstetricians, gynecologists, and primary care physicians
involved in prenatal testing would be one such solution. Section 191.923 of
the Missouri Code mandates:
When a prenatally diagnosed condition, including but not limited to Down
Syndrome, becomes known as a result of one or more prenatal tests, the
physician or other health care professional who requested or ordered prenatal
tests . . . shall provide the patient with current information about the conditions
that were tested for, the accuracy of such tests, and resources for obtaining
125
support services for such conditions.

This seems a far more rational way to promote informed consent than adopting
and adapting tort models to a situation that requires parents to avow, in open
court, that they would have aborted their child had the physician fully informed
them of their fetus’ genetic condition. Further, legislative mandates such as
these reach the people intended—all expectant parents of children with
congenital conditions—rather than the few who choose to pursue
compensation through tort action.126 Disciplinary action by state medical
licensing boards and increased federal and state regulation of laboratories that
conduct genetic testing are other alternatives to reducing medical
negligence.127
The second reason often offered in defense of wrongful birth and wrongful
life suits—that they compensate parents and children for injuries or losses
sustained as a result of a health care provider’s negligent conduct—is similarly
inaccurate and deceiving.128 Advocates of the system argue that these claims
operate “as a type of supplemental insurance that spreads such financial
hardships to parties who are more likely to be able to bear the cost.”129 This is

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 1618.
Id.; see also Sheth, supra note 6, at 665.
MO. REV. STAT. 191.923.3 (Supp. 2008).
See Sheth, supra note 6, at 665.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
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inaccurate, though, because the focus of a wrongful birth or wrongful life suit
is not the individual or family’s need for financial assistance.130 States have
entirely differed in their application and valuation of damages and the amount
of recovery they have allowed for wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.131
Thus, these claims “may provide substantial, but unnecessary, financial
support to some families and provide no relief to other families with
compelling need for financial support.”132
More importantly, financial recovery is neither available to all parents who
bear children with disabilities nor to all children born with such disabilities.
Rather, “recovery is limited to cases where parents testify that they would have
aborted the child or where children testify that they should have been
aborted . . . . ‘[O]nly to those willing to openly disavow their self-worth and
dignity.’”133 In the words of Darpana Sheth, “[b]y compensating those who
devalue children with congenital defects and denying recovery to those who
embrace these children, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims create a
perverse system that sends a negative message about the value of life with
disability.”134
Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may promote an unhealthy attitude
toward disabilities, escalate physician liability, and promote defensive
medicine. None of these results happen in a vacuum. As societal values shift,
national advisory groups and physician practice groups such as the ACOG
respond to insulate themselves from liability, the amalgam of interests
implicated by these suits may coalesce to form policy prescriptions that are not
optimal for society.
III. ACOG PRACTICE GUIDELINES
In January 2007, the ACOG published Practice Guidelines setting forth a
new set of guidelines for testing for certain congenital conditions.135 These
Practice Guidelines are ACOG’s recommendations to all practicing
obstetricians and gynecologists in the United States and are “designed to aid
practitioners in making decisions about appropriate gynecological care.”136
Thus, they are very influential and affect the everyday procedures of
physicians across the country. The stated goal of this bulletin was to “offer

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
See Hensel, supra note 3, at 160; see also Sheth, supra note 6, at 650–53.
Sheth, supra note 5, at 666.
Id. (quoting Hensel, supra note 3, at 171).
Id.
See ACOG 77, supra note 14.
Id. at 217.
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practical recommendations for implementing Down syndrome screening in
practice.”137
There are currently a variety of prenatal screening and testing medical
techniques available to obstetricians and their patients. There are ways to
obtain fetal tissue samples by amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling and
to test these tissue samples for genetic conditions such as Down syndrome.138
These tests, though, fall under the category of “invasive” tests.139 These
techniques carry a certain, not insignificant, amount of risk to the fetus, and for
that reason, it is “not . . . appropriate to examine every pregnancy this way.”140
As a result, screening tests have been developed to try to identify those
pregnancies at “high risk.”141 Screening tests are not as invasive.142 However,
they are more likely to be wrong.143 Screening tests do not provide definite
confirmation that a fetus has a certain condition.144 Screening tests provide an
adjusted estimate of the chances a certain fetus bears a certain condition.145
“There are ‘false-positives’ or ‘screen-positives’ ([when a] test states the
patient [or fetus] has the condition when the patient really doesn’t) and ‘falsenegatives’ ([when a] patient [or fetus] has the condition but the test states
he/she doesn’t).”146
“Because the [chance] of having a baby with Down syndrome [rises] above
the 1 in 250 mark [at age 35] for women,” the typical standard of care for the
last twenty-five years or so was “to offer the screen for Down syndrome to all
mothers 35 years and older.”147 This changed in January 2007, due to the
ACOG Practice Guidelines.148
The essence of the January 2007 ACOG Practice Guidelines is that
“[i]deally, all women should be offered aneuploidy screening before 20 weeks
of gestation, regardless of maternal age” and “[s]creening and invasive
diagnostic testing for aneuploidy should be available to all women who present
for prenatal care before 20 weeks of gestation regardless of maternal age.”149

137. Id.
138. Len Leshin, Prenatal Screening for Down Syndrome, 23 J. PERINATAL MED. (1995),
http://www.ds-health.com/prenatal.htm.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Leshin, supra note 138.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217.
149. Id. at 219, 224.
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This clinical recommendation was welcomed with less than enthusiasm by
many in the disability community, and understandably so. When this new
development is combined with the knowledge that the abortion rate for fetuses
with Down syndrome amongst mothers who have had prenatal testing hovers
between eighty to ninety percent, it is not difficult to see that “what is
antiseptically called ‘screening’ for Down syndrome is, much more often than
not, a search-and-destroy mission” that will result in an abortion.150 Though
stated in clinically neutral terms, “the implicit message the American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists seems to be sending is this: even though
racial, cultural and ethnic diversity are valued and supported in our society,
genetic diversity is not. It seems that it’s more important to be ‘normal’ than
to be ‘human.’”151
The National Down Syndrome Society (NDSS), a nonprofit organization
with more than 200 affiliates nationwide representing the more than 350,000
Americans with Down syndrome and their families, responded to ACOG’s
recommendations with a resolution containing two call-to-action points:
[First,] [c]hallenging and strongly encouraging health care professionals
and organizations like ACOG to partner with NDSS and other Down syndrome
organizations to ensure the wide-spread proliferation of balanced, accurate and
up-to-date information to expectant parents; and
[Second,] [u]rging health care professionals, policymakers, and the Down
syndrome community to work together to ensure that expectant parents are not
unduly influenced to undergo prenatal testing or to terminate a pregnancy after
152
receiving a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome.

The National Down Syndrome Congress (NDSC) condemned the ACOG
recommendations on the grounds that they “convey tacit approval for
terminating pregnancies where the fetus has Down syndrome.”153 The NDSC
cited several concerns. The main concern, of course, was that “[t]he primary
medical reason for first trimester screening is to encourage earlier diagnostic
testing in ‘at risk’ pregnancies, in order to facilitate early terminations. Other
reasons for prenatal diagnosis, such as hospital selection and delivery
management, do not require first trimester testing.”154

150. George F. Will, Golly, What Did Jon Do?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2007, at 72.
151. Bauer, supra note 97, at 70.
152. NAT’L DOWN SYNDROME SOC’Y, NATIONAL DOWN SYNDROME SOCIETY RESPONDS TO
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS’ NEW RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRENATAL TESTING (2007), http://ndss.yorkandchapel.com/index.php?view=article&catid=54%3
Apublic-relations&id=153%3Aposition-papers&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=140.
153. Press Release, Nat’l Down Syndrome Cong. (Jan. 23, 2007), http://www.ndsccenter.org/
resources/position.php (follow “January 23, 2007 NDSC Press Release regarding ACOG
screening recommendations” hyperlink).
154. Id.
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Another concern was that “the recommended screenings [would] produce
numerous false positives, potentially leading to unnecessary patient distress
and possible termination of pregnancies where medical concerns do not
exist.”155 For instance, “[a]pproximately 65% of pregnant women seeking
prenatal care received Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein (MSAFP) screening
by the early 1990s.”156 The MSAFP screen, though, has high false positive
rates and the “vast majority” of women who receive abnormal results carry
fetuses without abnormality.157 According to the American Pregnancy
Association, as many as one in twenty women tested will receive abnormal
MSAFP results, while only a range of one in sixteen to one in thirty-three
women receiving these abnormal results actually carry a fetus with a birth
defect.158 Therefore, ninety-four to ninety-seven percent of the women who
are told something may be wrong based on MSAFP results are carrying a fetus
that does not have any of the defects that MSAFP screens.159
As prenatal testing has become more routine, the “manner of obtaining
consent for the tests, the delivery of test results, and the decision-making
process that follows” have all been impacted.160 One significant change is that
obstetricians often handle the brunt of the prenatal testing responsibilities,
where prior this was done largely by geneticists.161 This could potentially
threaten informed consent because “obstetricians often lack the training in nondirectiveness given to genetic counselors and may unabashedly recommend or
encourage testing.”162 Accordingly, one recommendation of the NDSC was
that:
All screening and diagnostic tests need to be fully explained to patients, who
should be provided the opportunity to decline or give their informed consent
for testing. If patients decline certain tests, physicians and other medical
personnel should respect the individual’s wishes and not overtly or covertly
163
pressure patients to undergo undesired screenings.

When “obstetricians . . . fail [to explain] to patients . . . the purpose or
limitations of screening tests, such as when an obstetrician incorporates
screening tests as standard care, patients [may be] surprised and confused

155. Id.
156. Angela M. Hannemann, Comment, A New Routine: Assisting Patients in Responding to
Prenatal Diagnosis, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 337, 337 (2006).
157. Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 252
(2002).
158. Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein Screening (MSAFP),
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/prenataltesting/afp.html (last visited June 22, 2009).
159. See id.
160. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341.
161. Suter, supra note 157, at 242.
162. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341.
163. Press Release, Nat’l Down Syndrome Cong. supra note 153.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1308

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1287

[when told of] abnormal results.”164 For example, “[p]hysicians have routinely
described MSAFP screening . . . as ‘a simple blood test [to see] how [the] baby
is developing.’”165 Under such circumstances, “[a] woman is likely to
‘consent’ . . . without understanding” the full consequences of her actions,
without considering “whether she wants the information the test provides, or
[without] being aware of the test’s accuracy limitations.”166 Importantly, the
result of this state of affairs could be that “[t]his same directiveness and lack of
information may permeate the entire decision-making process as patients
determine whether to test further and whether to continue pregnancy.”167
Others in the disability community were similarly disenchanted with
ACOG’s recommendations and the ramifications of the new policy. An entire
population of people—a population that is “increasingly finishing high school,
living more independently and holding jobs”—was seemingly being
devalued.168 At least one court has noted that “[e]very recent study shows that
people afflicted with Down’s Syndrome can lead useful, productive, and
meaningful lives—that they can be educated, that they are employable, that
they can form friendships and relationships and can get along in society.”169
As Patricia Bauer has noted:
What’s gone undiscussed in the news coverage of the guidelines seems to be a
general assumption that reasonable people would want to screen for Down
syndrome. And since nothing can be done to mitigate the effects of an extra
21st chromosome in utero, the further assumption is that people would be
170
reasonable to terminate pregnancies that are so diagnosed.

Many worried that, in an era of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits and
increasing emphasis on early screening, it had become “better for business to
deliver only babies that the medical profession calls ‘good outcomes.’”171
Emphasis on clinical outcomes and avoidance of lawsuits had inadvertently led
one researcher to theorize that the ACOG and the doctors it represents:
have embarked upon the elimination of an entire class of people who have a
history of oppression, discrimination and exclusion. . .[and] in the process
[young parents] are giving away much of what defines America at its best: a
society that assumes responsibility for those who are vulnerable, a society that

164. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341 (citing Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the
Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 990 (1996)).
165. Id. (second and third and alterations in original) (quoting Andrews, supra note 164, at
990).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Patricia E. Bauer, The Abortion Debate No One Wants to Have, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,
2005, at A25.
169. Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123 (Md. 2002).
170. Patricia E. Bauer, What’s Lost in Prenatal Testing, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2007, at B7.
171. Bauer, supra note 97, at 70.
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accepts those who are different, a society marked by generosity, liberty and
172
freedom of thought.

One side effect of the drastically increased number of fetuses with
disabilities being aborted would be the necessarily decreased pool of peers for
persons born with disabilities. Another fear of disability rights advocates was
that ACOG’s Practice Guidelines would lead to a state of affairs where
abortion of a fetus with a disability became the standard of care. This is hardly
an impractical fear given the current abortion rate of fetuses with Down
syndrome.173 Asch has pointed out that “enumerating a set of testable genetic
diseases tells people who currently have those conditions that it would be
better if prospective parents went to considerable lengths to prevent the births
of children with those conditions.”174
In such an environment, it would not be unimaginable that insurance
companies could begin to deny coverage for babies with Down syndrome and
other disabilities because their parents had failed to comply with accepted
standards of care. At least one HMO has openly contemplated “withdraw[ing]
medical coverage for a woman who could have avoided the birth of a child
with cystic fibrosis if she had ‘chosen’ to abort the pregnancy after the prenatal
diagnosis was made.”175
Indeed, in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,176 an early California
case to accept a wrongful life claim, the court acknowledged in dicta that its
reasoning would support a cause of action by an impaired child against his
parents for inflicting an “injury” by choosing to give birth.177 “In the court’s
view, if parents made a conscious and informed choice to carry a seriously
impaired child to term, nothing should ‘protect [them] from being answerable
for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought on their
offspring.’”178 Though the California legislature stepped in to insulate parents
from such liability,179 the mere mention of such an action shows that it is not
inconceivable that states could honor such a claim in the future. If ACOG’s
recommendations are seen as evidence that eugenic abortion has truly become
the “standard of care,” it would certainly seem to increase the likelihood of
such a potential claim.

172. Id.
173. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 339; Will, supra note 150, at 72.
174. Asch, supra note 27, at 339.
175. Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and
Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 35 (1991).
176. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
177. Id. at 488; see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 159–60.
178. Hensel, supra note 3, at 159 (alteration in original) (citing Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
488).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 2007); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 159–60.
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As selective abortion becomes more the rule than the exception, a refusal
to abort a fetus with a disability “may be considered a personal assumption of
the risk of all of the struggles and hardships that follow the child’s birth.”180
Insurance considerations aside, disability is thus transformed from a societal
issue into an individual concern, undermining all work of the disability rights
movement.181 Under such circumstances any cohesive civil rights view of
disability would collapse back into medical model thinking and “society’s
assessment of the individual’s worth will be limited to the capability of current
medical techniques to identify and correct impairments.”182
Furthermore, while the ACOG recommendations are certainly intended to
reduce the number of lawsuits directed at gynecologists and obstetricians, they
invariably increase the potential pool of plaintiffs who can allege that a
physician has breached his or her duty to the mother.183 Because the standard
of care is now to recommend screening tests for all women, rather than just
women over thirty-five, the potential pool of plaintiffs who can allege that a
physician has breached his or her duty to the mother is vastly increased.184 For
instance, in Becker v. Schwartz,185 the plaintiff-mother had to prove that the
standard of care for a mother of her age was to be informed of her risk of
bearing a child with Down syndrome.186 Now, any potential mother bearing a
child with Down syndrome who was not informed of her chances of bearing
such a child may be able to show that a physician has potentially breached her
duty simply by reference to the ACOG’s Practice Guidelines.
Due in large part to the work of disability rights groups, ACOG issued
another monthly bulletin in December 2007, urging that “[a]fter the diagnosis
of a chromosomal abnormality, the patient should receive detailed information,
if known, about the natural history of individuals with the specific
chromosomal finding.”187 The bulletin also urged that patients be referred to a
genetic counselor, clinical geneticist, or groups such as the NDSS and NDSC
upon screening or definite results that their fetus has a genetic condition.188

180. Hensel, supra note 3, at 179–80.
181. ROTHMAN, supra note 119, at 9.
182. Hensel, supra note 3, at 181.
183. See Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ga. 1990)
(“[W]ith the continued advances in medical science which are occurring daily, the problems
presented by the concept of ‘wrongful birth’ actions can only become increasingly more
numerous and more complex.”); see also Hensel, supra note 3, at 142.
184. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217. The vast majority of children, including children
with Down syndrome, are born to mothers under the age of thirty-five. Will, supra note 150.
185. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
186. Id. at 811, 813
187. ACOG Practice Bulletin No. 88: Invasive Prenatal Testing for Aneuploidy, 109
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1459, 1464 (2007) [hereinafter ACOG 88].
188. Id.
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While it is certainly laudable that ACOG would reach out to disability
rights groups to help promote informed consent and proper genetic counseling,
this does not alter the fact that the accepted standard of care in current
medicine is to urge any means possible to identify a fetus with Down
syndrome or select other fetal chromosomal abnormalities. This begs the
question: Where is the line drawn between an “acceptable” and an
“unacceptable” disability? Or, in legal parlance, between a non-actionable and
an actionable disability?189 Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits have been
raised in instances of children born with Tay-Sachs disease, Down syndrome,
and congenital blindness, to name a few.190 Within the range of diagnosable
congenital conditions, it seems a slippery slope to begin labeling certain
conditions beyond hope.191
Particularly troubling is that, at the time a disability is diagnosed, the only
information that can be accurately communicated to parents is the
identification of the disability and perhaps some expected parameters of the
disability.192 To categorize certain disabilities as actionable but others as nonactionable thus ignores the variation within a given disability. The testing only
tells physicians and mothers that a fetus has a certain trait; it cannot predict
how severely or mildly that trait will be represented in the child.193 Success
stories abound for disabilities as various as Down syndrome,194 cystic
fibrosis,195 and spina bifida.196 Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits thus
ignore the potential richness of a life with a disability.197 Essentially, “[t]he
individual is the impairment, and the value of existence is judged on that basis
alone.”198
The problem of differentiating between actionable and non-actionable
conditions is again raised surrounding the issue of late-onset diseases.
“Huntington’s Disease, for example is a . . . debilitating and fatal condition that

189. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 182–83.
190. Id. at 181–82 & nn.219–21 (listing cases for each respective condition).
191. See e.g., id. at 181–90 (discussing the problem of “line drawing”).
192. Id. at 183.
193. Id.
194. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 183 & n.227; see e.g., Priscilla Anderson, Down’s
Syndrome: Cost, Quality and Value of Life, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 627 (2001) (detailing interviews
of people with Down syndrome discussing the quality of their lives).
195. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 183 & n.228 (“[A] child with cystic fibrosis ‘might die from
it, survive with physical disability, or suffer no noticeable impairment’”) (quoting Edward J.
Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 922
(2002))).
196. See Alison Davis, Yes, the Baby Should Live, 31 NEW SCIENTIST 54 (1985). Davis, who
has spina bifida, writes, “Despite my disability and the gloomy predictions made by doctors at my
birth, I am now leading a very full happy and satisfying life by any standards.” Id.
197. Hensel, supra note 3, at 183.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
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begins in adulthood,” but which can now be detected prenatally.199 Would
such a condition justify a jury verdict declaring the person’s life a compensable
damage?200 Such a claim has not been raised yet, but would not stray too far
theoretically from a typical wrongful birth or wrongful life action. When one
takes into account that the life expectancy of individuals with Huntington’s
disease is less than for individuals with Down syndrome, and that expenses
associated with Huntington’s disease far outweigh those associated with Down
syndrome, the application of wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits to
certain disabilities and not others seems particularly arbitrary and
irresponsible.201
With an accepted standard of care that currently targets a population of
people who may live rich and fulfilling lives, and with the ability to diagnose a
myriad of disorders—including late-onset disorders—it seems a scary
proposition to have state-sanctioned lawsuits declaring people’s lives to be
legally compensable injuries. It is thus necessary and proper for legislative
bodies to step in and protect the interests imperiled by wrongful birth and
wrongful life lawsuits.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A.

Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions Should Be Left to the
Legislative Branch

State legislatures should pass legislation to preclude wrongful birth and
wrongful life causes of action. The legitimacy of wrongful birth and wrongful
life actions, even if not defeated by the ADA, is more properly resolved by the
legislative branch. The statutory approach in states that have chosen to pass
legislation regarding wrongful birth and wrongful life actions is to disavow
both actions.202

199. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 184; Suter, supra note 157, at 237 (“With the rapid
identification of numerous genes through the Human Genome Project, scientists began to isolate
genes associated with late-onset conditions.”).
200. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 185 & n. 237. The question raised, of course, is whether a
portion of a rich and fulfilling life can be offset by avoidable (via abortion) pain and suffering.
Some scholars have compared and contrasted wrongful birth and wrongful life cases with rightto-die cases. See, e.g., Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in “Wrongful Life” Actions, 42
Hastings L.J. 505, 548 (1991). To the extent that right-to-die issues are raised by the question
posed, this is not the intent of the author. Such questions far exceed the scope of this Comment.
201. See generally Suter, supra note 157.
202. See Sheth, supra note 5, at 652 n.71; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (1986)
(precluding actions claiming “person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but
would have been aborted”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (1998) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.424 (1993) (banning wrongful birth and wrongful life claims alleging a child would have
been aborted); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (2000) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (1993)
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Missouri is one of the states to take initiative in rejecting both wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions. Section 188.130 of the Missouri Code
provides that:
1. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages
on behalf of himself or herself based on the claim that but for the negligent
conduct of another, he or she would have been aborted.
2. No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of damages
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would
203
have been aborted.

The two portions of this provision are intended to apply to wrongful life and
wrongful birth causes of action, respectively.
Only one state has passed legislation approving of wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions.204 Nine, however, have disapproved of these causes of
action.205 This is in stark contrast to the number of states that have accepted
some form of wrongful birth action via judicial approval.206 It seems a fair
question to ask: Why the discrepancy?
Some courts have come to the conclusion that the legislature is the more
appropriate place for debate and decisionmaking, especially when dealing with
questions that have such broad implications for society.207 If, after the robust
public debate encouraged by the legislative format, many states have decided
to preclude wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action, it would seem to
indicate that some of the twenty-three jurisdictions that have allowed these
causes of action via judicial approval might also decide to ban wrongful birth
and wrongful life tort actions.
In four of the nine states that have prohibited wrongful birth and wrongful
life causes of action, the statutes have never been challenged.208 Of cases that

(precluding wrongful life actions); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(B) (1993) (precluding
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims alleging that “a person once conceived would not or
should not have been born”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (1987) (banning wrongful life);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1993) (banning claims alleging that a person would not have been
permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600-2971 (West 2004) (banning both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions).
203. MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130.
204. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (2000); see also Thibeault v. Larson, 666 A.2d
112 (Me. 1995) (interpreting section 2931 to authorize recovery of damages for wrongful birth).
205. See sources cited supra note 202.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 61–68; see also Sheth, supra note 6, at 650 n.59.
207. See e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); see also supra Part II.
208. Julie F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims
for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 256–57 (1995). The four states are Idaho, Indiana,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id. n.106. Utah has only one case arising under its statute, and
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have challenged the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting wrongful birth and
wrongful life statutes, the claim is that these statutes unduly burden a woman’s
access to an abortion.209 No such challenge has thus far been successful.210
Courts have typically rejected constitutional challenges to statutes barring
wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action either by reasoning that the
statute’s effect does not constitute state action211 or that the statute’s bar on
these causes of action does not affect the right to terminate a pregnancy.212
While it is certainly important that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions not
be legislatively prohibited for the express purpose of restricting a woman’s
access to an abortion, courts have thus far rejected such analysis.213 The logic
of denying such a challenge seems to hold up. A ban on wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions—brought after a child’s birth—has seemingly no effect
on a woman’s access to prenatal services such as an abortion.214

the opinion explicitly states that it does not consider the constitutionality of the statute. C.S. v.
Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988).
209. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1993).
210. See, e.g., Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Wilson v.
Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo.banc 1988); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985);
Edmonds v. W. Pa. Hosp. Radiology Assocs., 607 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
211. See, e.g., Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 10 (finding lack of state action and therefore no
constitutional violation); Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1083 (upholding statute based on lack of state
action).
212. See, e.g., Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14 (stating that the statute barring wrongful birth suits
“does not directly interfere with the woman’s right to choose a safe abortion”); Edmonds, 607
A.2d at 1087 (concluding that statute “neither regulates nor directly affects [abortion] rights”).
213. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 10; Edmonds, 607 A.2d at 1087.
214. According to Darpana M. Sheth,
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims may violate Title II of the ADA in three respects.
First, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims discriminate against individuals protected
by the ADA, namely the children [involved in the actions] . . . . Second, . . . these causes
of action discriminate against [the children involved in the lawsuits] on the basis of their
disabilities . . . . Third, judicial and legislative recognition and state enforcement of
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims constitute discrimination by a public entity.
Sheth, supra note 6, at 655. That wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may violate the ADA
does not appear to have been litigated at this point, but may in the future present a persuasive
argument that these suits are void as in violation of the ADA. See id. at 655–64. But see Kowitz,
supra note 208 (arguing that “statutes barring wrongful life and wrongful birth actions absolutely
contradict the principles of informed consent espoused in Casey” and that under the statutory safe
harbor physicians might be more likely to withhold information regarding “the health of the
fetus” which “is so integral to informed choice that its omission substantially obstructs a woman’s
right to choose abortion”).
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State and Federal Legislation Is Necessary to Establish Informed Genetic
Counseling

It is now nationally recognized that there is a vast deficiency in data
needed to better “understand the epidemiology of prenatally diagnosed
conditions, to monitor trends accurately, and to increase the effectiveness of
health intervention.”215 The reason for such a deficiency is undoubtedly due to
the unique confluence of factors discussed in this Comment.
Recognizing that “[t]he extent and quality of the information provided to
patients both before [prenatal] testing and upon delivery of the test results is a
matter of critical importance because these results demand decisions
concerning whether to abort, proceed with further tests, plan for adoption, or
make special birth arrangements,”216 Missouri passed legislation regarding
prenatal testing and women’s access to counseling.217 Section 191.923 of the
Missouri Code states that “pregnant women who choose to undergo prenatal
screening should have access to timely and informative counseling about the
conditions being tested for, the accuracy of such tests, and resources for
obtaining support services for such conditions.”218
The rationale of Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code is that “[i]nformed
consent is a critical component of all genetic testing and prenatal screening . . .
and the counseling that follows may lead to the unnecessary abortion of unborn
humans with Down syndrome or other prenatally diagnosed conditions.”219
The legislation implicitly recognizes that “directiveness and lack of
information may permeate the entire decision-making process”220 if a
concerted effort is not made at the very beginning of the process to honor and
promote informed consent.
In the modern legal setting, including the availability of wrongful birth and
wrongful life suits, physicians are very aware that the “clearest evidence of
compliance is to have a patient take the test . . . prompt[ing] many healthcare
professionals, at a minimum, to encourage . . . screening.”221 Legislation thus
may be necessary to counter this impulse to practice defensive medicine.

215. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th Cong.
§ 2(a)(2) (2007) (as introduced in the Senate, July 18, 2007) (enacted as Prenatally and
Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No. 110-374, 122 Stat. 4051 (2008) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-8)); accord Prenatally Diagnosed Condition Awareness Act of
2007, H.R. 3112, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2007) (as introduced in House, July 19, 2007).
216. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 338.
217. MO. REV. STAT. § 191.923 (Supp. 2008) (introduced as H.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assem.
(Mo. 2008)).
218. § 191.923.1.
219. Id.
220. Hannemann, supra note 156, at 341.
221. Suter, supra note 157, at 253.
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Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code and the Prenatally and Postnatally
Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, by making informed consent the focal
point of the legislation, 222 recognize the tendency toward defensive medicine
and promote an entire process that is instead permeated by non-directiveness
and support. Missouri’s legislation states, more specifically:
When a prenatally diagnosed condition, including but not limited to Down
Syndrome, becomes known as a result of one or more prenatal tests, the
physician or other health care professional who requested or ordered prenatal
tests . . . shall provide the patient with current information about the conditions
that were tested for, the accuracy of such tests, and resources for obtaining
223
support services for such conditions.

The statute goes on to establish support services such as “a clearinghouse of
information concerning supportive services providers, information hotlines
specific to Down Syndrome or other prenatally diagnosed conditions, resource
centers, education, other support programs for parents and families, and the
alternatives to abortion services program under [Missouri law].”224
The Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act
offers many of the same resources.225 The legislation calls for “the expansion
and further development of the National Dissemination Center for Children
with Disabilities,”226 “the establishment of a national registry . . . of families
willing to adopt newborns with Down syndrome or other prenatally or
postnatally diagnosed conditions,”227 and “the establishment of awareness and
education programs for health care providers who provide, interpret, or inform
parents of the results of prenatal tests for Down syndrome or other prenatally
or postnatally diagnosed conditions.”228
In keeping with its emphasis on informed consent, the legislation mandates
that upon receipt of a positive prenatal or postnatal diagnosis,229 parents be
222. See Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, S. 1810, 110th
Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2007) (as introduced in the Senate, July 18, 2007) (“Informed consent is a
critical component of all genetic testing.”).
223. § 191.923.3.
224. Id.
225. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act sec. 3, § 399R(b)(1).
226. Id. § 399R(b)(1)(B)(ii).
227. Id. § 399R(b)(1)(B)(iv).
228. Id. § 399R(b)(1)(B)(v).
229. While it has gone largely undiscussed during the course of this Comment, there is
certainly great room for improvement regarding the state of affairs surrounding postnatal
diagnosis of congenital condition and the subsequent delivery of this news to new parents. See
Skotko, supra note 97, at 73. Skotko concludes with ten recommendations for health care
professionals: (1) “[T]he person to deliver postnatal diagnosis should be a physician,” (2)
obstetricians “should coordinate their messages with neonatologists and pediatricians,” (3)
diagnoses “should be delivered once the mother is settled and as soon as a physician suspects the
diagnosis,” (4) “whenever possible, the physician should make the announcement with both
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provided “[u]p-to-date, evidence-based, written information concerning the
range of outcomes for individuals living with the diagnosed condition,
including physical, developmental, educational, and psychosocial
outcomes.”230
The legislation further requires that the Government Accountability Office
later “submit report[s] . . . concerning the effectiveness of current healthcare
and family support programs serving as resources for the families of children
with disabilities.”231
CONCLUSION
That we are being propelled in the direction of Brave New World is obvious.
But no less obvious is the fact that we can, if we so desire, refuse to co-operate
with the blind forces that are propelling us. For the moment, however, the
232
wish to resist does not seem to be very strong or very widespread.

The availability of wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits has led to a
situation where the legal climate of America has great sway over physician
practices.233 For example, in the 1970s, ACOG’s legal department began
advising that obstetricians use the newly minted technology of AlphaFetoprotein screening kits in order to provide a legal defense to any actions
brought against them for the birth of a child with a defect.234 The routinization
of prenatal testing and the use of “testing as a standard of care has been largely
rooted in legal rather than medical necessity.”235 In such a climate, it is not
difficult to see that ACOG’s most recent Practice Guidelines are at least in part
due to the increased liability that directly results from wrongful birth and
wrongful life tort actions. Thanks to the human genome project, prenatal
screening tests are available earlier in pregnancies and are available to
diagnose more disorders.236

parents present in a private setting,” (5) “when delivering [a diagnosis], the physician should first
congratulate the parents on the birth of their child and should not forget to talk about the positive
aspects” of the congenital condition diagnosed, (6) health care professionals should keep their
personal opinions to themselves,” (7) “mothers should be provided with up-to-date printed
materials,” (8) “parents should be provided access to other families who have children with” the
same congenital condition, (9) “after the initial diagnosis . . . , parents should be offered a private
hospital room,” and (10) “all physicians should be cognizant of the realities and possibilities of”
modern day life with the diagnosed congenital condition. Id. at 74–76.
230. Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act sec. 3, § 399R(c)(1)(A)
(emphasis added).
231. Id. § 399R(d).
232. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED, 23–24 (1958).
233. See Hannemann, supra note 156, at 342.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Hensel, supra note 3, at 142 & n.5.
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As Asch has noted, “[p]romoting informed reproductive choice may be the
stated goal of test developers, but the generally expected and desired result of a
disability diagnosis is the termination of that particular pregnancy in hopes that
the next one will yield an embryo or fetus free of a detectable trait.”237 Thus,
society seems to have determined that it is more worthwhile and efficient to
“‘solve’ problems of disability by prenatal detection and abortion, rather than
by expending those resources in improving” conditions for members of the
community with disabilities.238
ACOG’s most recent Practice Guidelines “offer practical recommendations
for implementing Down syndrome screening in practice.”239 While clinically
neutral, the Practice Guidelines are representative of a larger and disturbing
trend: the devaluation of the lives of the disabled. This societal trend is evident
not only by the continued acceptance of wrongful birth and, in fewer
jurisdictions, wrongful life actions, but also by the implicit acceptance of
eugenic abortions.
The ACOG Practice Guidelines will form the crux of how prenatal
screening tests will be used by physicians around the country. Are there
appropriate safeguards in place to ensure that expectant mothers who agree to
prenatal testing have done so with full, informed consent? Evidence seems to
indicate that with the system currently in place, this question must be answered
in the negative.240 Are women who choose to abort a fetus with a congenital
condition doing so with full, accurate information and after appropriate nondirective counseling? The current abortion rate for fetuses with Down
syndrome juxtaposed with the 214 family-long waiting list to adopt a child
with Down syndrome241 seems to indicate to this author that there is a
fundamental disconnect between the information presented to women
following a prenatal diagnosis of a congenital condition and the actual
potential of these individuals. The full potential of many people with such
congenital conditions to live a rich and fulfilling life and to bring joy to those
around them seems too often to be overlooked.
Legislation is necessary to remedy this disconnect. Missouri’s tort reform
to protect health care providers from wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
is a model that should be duplicated by other states. While national legislation

237. Asch, supra note 27, at 336 (quoting Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind
About Prenatal Diagnosis: Reflections and Refinements, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY
RIGHTS supra note 44, at 234, 240).
238. Id. at 333.
239. See ACOG 77, supra note 14, at 217.
240. See Andrews, supra note 164, at 974–75; Suter, supra note 157, at 256.
241. Will, supra note 150 (“At least 85 percent of pregnancies in which Down syndrome is
diagnosed are ended by abortions.”); see also 151 CONG. REC. S2982 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Brownback) (“For some conditions that can be detected in the womb, such as
Down Syndrome, we are aborting 80 percent or more of the babies who test positive.”).
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banning such causes of action is unlikely,242 there is a strong argument that
statutes and judicial decisions allowing wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions violate the ADA.243 In addition, state legislators who wish to make
their states friendlier for obstetricians to practice and who recognize the
damage done to people with disabilities and to society’s conception of
disability by these tort actions should enact legislation similar to Section
188.130 of the Missouri Code to eliminate the legal threat posed by wrongful
birth and wrongful life suits and to reinforce the equality for citizens with
disabilities promised by the ADA.
With the recent ACOG Practice Guidelines, federal legislation modeled on
Section 191.923 of the Missouri Code is necessary to ensure that informed
consent is a prerequisite to prenatal testing and that any genetic counseling
upon diagnosis of a congenital condition is done in a non-directive manner.
The Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, signed
into law in October 2008 by President Bush, will help to ensure that a pregnant
woman never “feel[s] that her options are limited by a lack of public support
for the types of social services that could help her, her family, and her
baby.”244
MATTHEW DIEHR*

242. While it is true that many pro-choice scholars oppose wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions for reasons presented throughout this Comment, this does mean the issue has become depoliticized. While no challenges to state legislation banning wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions on the grounds that such legislation unduly burdens a woman’s right to an abortion have
been successful, these challenges surely have not escaped the notice of the U.S. Congress. While
the author would certainly advocate this national legislation, it is unlikely that Congress would
attempt to pass such legislation. See discussion supra Part IV.B; see also Liz Townsend, Pro-Life
News in Brief, NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Nov./Dec. 2008, http://www.nrlc.org/news/
2008/NRL11/BriefNews.html. Townsend quotes Senator Brownback as saying, in reference to
the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, “President Bush signed into
law a bill that will help an untold number of expecting parents who learn that their unborn child
may be born with a disability . . . . This is a great victory for the culture of life we should all seek
to promote.” It is evident, then, that even the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions
Awareness Act—certainly less controversial than any federal attempt to ban wrongful birth and
wrongful life suits—overcame its share of partisan hurdles on its way to passage.
243. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
244. 151 CONG. REC. H9919 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
* J.D. 2009, Saint Louis University School of Law. The author would like to thank his family.
Also Kelly Dineen, faculty advisor, and the Down Syndrome Association of St. Louis.
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